A higher level of debt may help in aligning the interests of managers and shareholders; however, managers may underestimate the resulting costs of bankruptcy. Moreover, notwithstanding the tax and other benefits of debt, literature shows that firms may have more debt in their capital structure than is appropriate. A higher level of leverage becomes detrimental by increasing the chances of financial distress and, consequently, the chances of bankruptcy. This study investigated relationships between changes in promoter ownership and changes in leverage by taking a sample of 322 Indian service and manufacturing firms from Top 500 Companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) for a period of five years (from 2010-2014). The results indicate that changes in promoter ownership play a role in lowering the leverage of Indian firms and, consequently, reducing the chances of bankruptcy. The findings of this study also indicate that changes in promoter ownership have more effect on the leverage of Indian service firms as compared to manufacturing firms. This study contributes to the literature on the factors that affect the leverage of the firm. The findings may be useful for financial managers, investors, financial management consultants, and other stakeholders.
Introduction
One of the most important challenges facing almost every firm is the potential of bankruptcy. Although studies have been conducted on firm leverage since Modigliani and Miller (1958) developed the theory of capital structure, the issue of optimality of capital structure has been debated for many years and it is still one of the unsolved issues in the corporate finance literature. Many theoretical studies and much empirical research have addressed this issue, but there is not yet a fully supported and unanimously accepted theory concerning the optimal capital structure (Morri and Beretta, 2008) . Firm leverage is one of the most important factors that can cause bankruptcy; therefore, it is important to determine the factors that reduce the risk associated with high leverage. This study examines the relationship between promoter ownership and corporate leverage of Indian manufacturing and service firms measured by financial leverage and debt leverage.
The definition of promoter ownership, in the context of this study, is concentrated firm ownership by family members, relatives, and in some case by friends. Thus, the promoter and his/her associates (i.e., immediate family members, relatives, and friends) are owners of an entity with controlling stakes. It is also notable that the ownership of these family firms is frequently associated with pyramiding, cross holding, and family trusts. Moreover, Kumar and Singh (2013) defined promoters as a group of persons who are involved in the incorporation and organization of a corporation. Non-promoter shareholders include banks, financial institutions, and mutual fund companies (Chakraborthy et al., 2008) .
Since a majority of the promoters belong to the same families, relatives, and in some cases, friends, the agency problem under the governance of promoters is low (Schulze et al., 2003) ; therefore, it is expected that corporate governance by promoters and their associates reduces the leverage of Indian firms. The basic foundation of this study relies on the agency theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976) . Agency theory focuses on the function of the board and serves as the basic foundation of the structure of the board of directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) . According to agency theory, agency conflict (i.e., conflict between principal and agent) takes place in corporations because managers may not work in the best interests of shareholders to make 'corporate assets' productive and to maximize shareholders' wealth.
A higher level of debt may help in aligning the interests of managers and shareholders, however, managers may underestimate the resulting costs of bankruptcy (Gleason et al., 2000) . Moreover, literature shows that firms may have more debt in their capital structure than is appropriate (Harris and Raviv, 1991) . Thus, these factors indicate that firms may have more debt in their capital structure than is appropriate relative to the optimal amount, and this can have an adverse effect by increasing exposure to financial distress and by increasing volatility in share price of the individual firm which in turn has a negative impact on the wealth of shareholders (Aydemir, Gallmeyer, and Hollifield, 2007; Jambawo, 2014) . Therefore, an optimal capital structure is required because it maximizes a firm's performance, which in turn reduces the chances of bankruptcy. The findings of Danis, Rettl, and Whited (2014) showed that at times when firms are at or close to their optimal level of leverage, the correlation between profitability and leverage is positive. The firm's optimal capital structure depends on the trade-off between the chances of bankruptcy and the tax benefits from firm leverage. Studies also showed that firms prefer issuing equity rather than debt when their stock prices are high (Graham and Harvey, 2001; Olokoyo, 2013, p. 359) .
It is commonly agreed that the board of directors is formed by the majority shareholders (i.e., shareholders who own at least 51% of the equity of the firm) who control the corporation by formulating new policies and by amending existing corporate policies that impact the operations of the firm (Owens, 2010) . Since a majority of the shares in the hands of promoters belongs to family members and relatives, the board of directors formed by promoters can function better to reduce the risk of leverage by reducing inappropriate levels of debt and, consequently, can reduce the chances of bankruptcy. This leads to the following research question:
Do changes in promoter ownership affect leverage of Indian firms?
Although some research has been conducted on promoter ownership and firm value (see Kumar and Singh, 2013) , very few published studies were found that show the relationship between promoter ownership and leverage of the firm. Therefore, the present study tests the relationship between promoter ownership and leverage of Indian manufacturing and service firms. This research study proposes that promoter ownership has a strong influence on the reduction of inappropriate levels of debt because family members and their relatives generally control the board of directors formed by promoters. These family members and relatives expect to have an optimal capital structure of the firm by playing a better stewardship role to control the debt/liabilities of the firm. Thus, this study adds empirical substance to existing theory.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section two examines previous literature and develops hypotheses. Section three describes the data and methodology used to investigate the research question. Section four discusses and analyzes the empirical results. Section five concludes and considers the implications of the findings.
Literature review
La Porta et al. (1999) showed that concentrated ownership has become the most common form of ownership in most of the countries in the world. Indeed, family control through promoter ownership is the most common in India (Chakraborthy et al., 2008) . Promoter ownership has a major impact on corporations in terms of controlling leverage because promoters have considerable power to make strategic decisions (Kumar and Singh, 2013 ). However, too much power in the hands of promoters and their associates may become detrimental because it enables them to pursue their own interests rather than corporate interests which leads to an agency problem. The power to pursue their own personal interests comes from voting rights and control over management which enables promoters and their associates to pursue their own interests by formulating corporate policies that may have a negative impact on the firm.
Firms use a mix of debt and equity in order to minimize the cost of capital (Modigliani and Miller, 1958) and to reduce the chances of bankruptcy. In family controlled firms, it is common to use internal sources of equity from family, friends (Gill et al., 2012) and retained earnings. Myers (1984) referred to this as a "pecking order" where firms use internally generated funds before they look for external financing. Therefore, the capital structure of family controlled firms differs from that of non-family controlled publically traded firms.
Under the control of promoter ownership, family members, relatives, and friends form the board of directors. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) reported that there is a significant relationship between board size and capital structure. It is also possible that the head of the family acts as the CEO and director of the board. CEO duality (the CEO performing a concurrent role as chairman of the board) influences the financing decisions of the firm. Fama and Jensen (1983) claimed that if the CEO controls the board, this implies or signals an absence of separation of decision management and decision control. This can lead to higher leverage. Alba et al., (1998) used data from Thailand and found that ownership concentration is positively linked with leverage. The injection of capital from family members, relatives, and friends, however, can lead to lower the leverage.
According to Yermack (1996) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) , smaller boards of directors are more effective in the decision-making process than larger boards of directors. Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) also argued that small board sizes promote effective communication and decision-making. Jensen (1993) also indicated that a lack of independent leadership creates difficulty for boards to respond to failure in top management. Fama and Jensen (1983) also argued that concentration of decision management and decision control in one individual hinders boards' effectiveness in monitoring top management. Empirical studies on corporate governance and firm leverage are as follows:
Wen et al., (2002) found that board composition is negatively linked with leverage of firms in China. Du and Dai (2005) used data of East Asian firms from 1994-96 and found that controlling owners with little shareholding choose higher debt.
Abor (2007) examined the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure decisions by taking a sample of 22 firms listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) during the six-year period (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) . Abor found that capital structure is positively associated with board size, board composition, and CEO duality.
Antoniou et al., (2008) conducted a study to investigate how firms operating in capital marketoriented economies (the U.K. and the U.S.) and bankoriented economies (France, Germany, and Japan) determine their capital structure. They found that corporate governance practices and exposure to capital markets heavily influence the capital structure of a firm.
Bodaghi and Ahmadpour (2010) collected data from 50 Iranian firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange to test the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure. They found a negative relationship between board size and debt to equity ratio. Authors also found that CEO duality does not significantly influence corporate financing behavior. Saad (2010) , by taking a sample of 126 Malaysian publically listed companies found i) a negative relationship between CEO duality and capital structure, and ii) positive relationships between board size and capital structure. Rehman et al., (2010) Gill et al., (2012) sampled small business owners from India and found that small business growth and family involvement positively influence the capital structure of small business firms.
Jiraporn, Kim, Kim, and Kitsabunnarat (2012) using a sample of 7,557 firms reported by the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) from 2001 to 2004 found that firms with poor governance are significantly more leveraged. The authors also showed that poor governance quality likely brings about, and does not merely reflect, higher leverage.
Strebulaev and Yang (2013) using a sample of American firms found that family firms are more likely to be zero-levered. This finding suggest that promoter ownership reduces leverage of the firm because majority of the shareholders in promoter ownership belong to the same family and relatives.
Chang, Chou, and Huang (2014) took a sample of 4,297 from COMPUSTAT and found that overleveraged firms with weak corporate governance adjust capital structure slowly to reduce high levels of debt.
In summary, literature review shows that corporate governance influences the leverage of firms. Hence, we formulate the following hypotheses:
H1) Promoter ownership reduces financial leverage of the Indian firms.
H2) Promoter ownership reduces debt leverage of the Indian firms.
Methods
The study applied a co-relational and nonexperimental research design. This process of measurement is central to quantitative research because it provides the fundamental connection between empirical observation and mathematical expression of quantitative relationships.
Measurement
To remain consistent with previous studies, measures were adopted from Gill, Biger, and Mand's (2013) study. Table 1 shows the measurements of the dependent, independent, and control variables that were used in regression analysis. Notes:  FL = LTDTAR (long-term debt to total asset ratio) = Long-term debt/total assets  DL = DTER (debt to equity ratio) = Total debt/total equity  Firm size = Natural log (ln) of average assets  Net profit margin = Net income after tax/revenue
Empirical model

Data collection
A database was built from a selection of 500 financial reports from  Net profit margin: ∆NPM11 = -5%; ∆NPM12 = -10%; ∆NPM13 = -5%.
Descriptive statistics
 Industry: 0.53. Notes: Variables include changes in financial leverage (FL), debt leverage (DL), promoter ownership (PO), sales growth (SG), firm size (FS), net profit margin (NPM), and industry (INDUSTRY).
Pearson bivariate correlation analysis
The correlation coefficient matrix exhibits negative and significant correlations between FL12 and PO11, FL13 and PO12, and FL14 and PO13 (ρ PO11, FL12 = -0.119, ρ PO12, FL13 = -0.125, and ρ PO13, FL14 = -0.135 respectively, all significant at the five percent level), implying that change in promoter ownership changes financial leverage of the Indian firms. The correlation coefficient matrix also exhibits negative and significant correlations between DL12 and PO11, DL13 and PO12, and DL14 and PO13 (ρ PO11, DL12 = -0.130, ρ PO12, DL13 = -0.117, and ρ PO13, DL14 = -0.142 respectively, all significant at the five percent level), implying that change in promoter ownership changes debt leverage of the Indian firms (see Table 3 ). Notes: Variables include changes in financial leverage (FL), debt leverage (DL), promoter ownership (PO), sales growth (SG), firm size (FS), net profit margin (NPM), and industry (INDUSTRY). ***, ** and * imply significance of each mean difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Analysis and discussion
In this section, we present the empirical findings on the relationship between promoter ownership and corporate leverage of the Indian service and manufacturing firms. There was possibility of endogeneity issues because we used ordinary least square (OLS) multiple regression analysis. The issues of endogeneity also occur if certain variables are omitted and there are measurement errors. To minimize endogeneity issues, the most important variables that affect financial leverage and debt leverage were used.
4.1
Promoter ownership, financial leverage, and debt leverage FL12  FL12  FL13  FL13  FL14  FL14  DL12  DL12  DL13  DL13  DL14  DL14 Notes: In the Ordinary Least Square Regression (OLS) models, the dependent variables are changes in financial leverage (FL) and debt leverage (DL). Independent variable is changes in promoter ownership (PO) and control variables include changes in sales growth (SG), firm size (FS), net profit margin (NPM), and industry (INDUSTRY). ***, ** and * imply significance of each mean difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
4.2
Promoter ownership, financial leverage, and debt leverage in service industry Notes: In the Ordinary Least Square Regression (OLS) models, the dependent variables are changes in financial leverage (FL) and debt leverage (DL). Independent variable is changes in promoter ownership (PO) and control variables include changes in sales growth (SG), firm size (FS), and net profit margin (NPM). ***, ** and * imply significance of each mean difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Table 6 . Results from manufacturing industry sample -promoter ownership, financial leverage, and debt leverage Notes: In the Ordinary Least Square Regression (OLS) models, the dependent variables are changes in financial leverage (FL) and debt leverage (DL). Independent variable is changes in promoter ownership (PO) and control variables include changes in sales growth (SG), firm size (FS), and net profit margin (NPM). ***, ** and * imply significance of each mean difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Conclusion
The present study found that promoter ownership and promoter control reduces both financial and debt leverage of Indian firms. This may be because the agency problem is low when promoters control firms. As described in the introductory section, a majority of the promoters belong to the same families, relatives, and in some cases, friends. The agency problem under the governance of promoters is low because a majority of the shareholders is from the same family and from relatives (Schulze et al., 2003) . Thus, the findings lend some support to agency theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976) in that promoter ownership reduces financial and debt leverage of Indian firms. However, promoter ownership impacts more in the service industry than the manufacturing industry in reducing both the financial and debt of Indian firms.
Limitations
This study is limited to the sample of Indian service and manufacturing firms. This is a co-relational study that investigated the association between promoter ownership and the components of corporate leverage. There is not necessarily a causal relationship between the two. The findings of this study could only be generalized to firms similar to those that were included in this research. In addition, sample size is small.
Future research
Future study should be conducted on different countries to see if the findings support the findings of this study in other countries.
